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Abstract: We study a general class of repeated auctions, such as the ones found in electricity
markets, as multi-agent games between the bidders. In such a repeated setting, bidders can adapt
their strategies online based on the data observed in the previous auction rounds. Moreover, if
no-regret algorithms are employed by the bidders to update their strategies, the game is known
to converge to a coarse-correlated equilibrium, which generalizes the notion of Nash equilibrium
to a probabilistic view of the auction state. Well-studied no-regret algorithms depend on the
feedback information available at every round, and can be mainly distinguished as bandit (or
payoff-based), and full-information. However, the information structure found in auctions lies
in between these two models, since participants can often obtain partial observations of their
utilities under different strategies. To this end, we modify existing bandit algorithms to exploit
such additional information. Specifically, we utilize the feedback information that bidders can
obtain when their bids are not accepted, and build a more accurate estimator of the utility
vector. This results in improved regret guarantees compared to standard bandit algorithms.
Moreover, we propose a heuristic method for auction settings where the proposed algorithm is
not directly applicable. Finally, we demonstrate our findings on case studies based on realistic
electricity market models.
Keywords: auctions; game theory; no-regret algorithms; coarse-correlated equilibrium;
electricity markets.
1. INTRODUCTION
Auctions are effective tools for allocating resources and de-
termining their values among a set of participants. To this
end, many complex auction mechanisms have been pro-
posed to buy and sell different resources. Prominent exam-
ples include those in spectrum auctions (Cramton, 2013;
Bichler and Goeree, 2017), electricity markets (Ahlstrom
et al., 2015; Cramton, 2017), auctions for fish harvesting
rights and other natural capitals (Bichler et al., 2019;
Teytelboym, 2019). Moreover, a periodic recurrence is
intrinsic to several applications. For instance, in electricity
markets, the same participants are generally involved in
similar market transactions day after day (Bose and Low,
2019; Abbaspourtorbati and Zima, 2015).
Repeated auctions can be studied as multi-agent
games among different players, or bidders in the auction,
equipped with adaptive and sequential bidding algorithms.
In such repeated games, the performance of a player is
typically measured in terms of regret, which is the utility
loss incurred when compared to the best fixed action
over a sequence of rounds. Moreover, if all players exhibit
no-regret, that is, a diminishing regret as the number of
rounds increase, the game is known to reach a so-called
coarse-correlated equilibrium. This equilibrium concept
? This research was gratefully funded by the European Union
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??These authors contributed equally to this work.
generalizes Nash equilibrium to the case where all players
are endowed with a probability distribution over the
state of the game, see (Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006)
and (Roughgarden, 2016, Ch. 13).
Several no-regret learning algorithms exist, and both the
algorithms and their performance crucially depend on the
feedback information available at every round of the game.
In the full-information setting, where the player observes
its utility under every action (Freund and Schapire, 1997),
such algorithms attain an optimal O(√T logK) regret,
with T being the horizon length, and K being the num-
ber of actions. When only bandit feedback is available,
that is, the player only observes its utility for the ac-
tion picked (Auer et al., 2002), the optimal regret is
O(√KT logK) with a significantly worse dependence on
the number of actions K. However, the information struc-
ture found in auctions lies in between these two models;
on the one hand, full-information feedback is unrealistic
since it requires perfect knowledge of opponents’ bids and
market constraints, and on the other hand, bandit feed-
back is too restrictive since partial observations of utilities
under different actions are often available owing to the
auction rules and the additional information released. For
instance, in auctions of electrical power marginal prices are
announced after every round (NYISO, 2018; ENTSO-E,
2018). Motivated by these particularities of auctions, our
goal is to extend existing bandit algorithms to account for
such additional information.
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Our contributions are as follows. We consider no-regret
learning in a general class of repeated auctions. Employing
standard results from the multi-armed bandit literature,
we propose an algorithm that participants could use to
update their bidding strategies based on the observed
auction data. Specifically, our approach exploits the in-
formation available to the bidders when their bids are not
accepted by the auctioneer. We show that the proposed
algorithm enjoys a no-regret guarantee that can strictly
improve upon bandit algorithms. We demonstrate this
fact on a market with a simple supply-demand balance
constraint and a marginal pricing payment mechanism.
Then, we consider a more general market setting for which
the algorithm is not directly applicable since it requires
parameters that are unknown in this setting, that is, reve-
lation probabilities for additional information. We propose
a heuristic method for this case and demonstrate it out-
performs existing bandit algorithms in our experiments.
Let us contrast our work with the existing works on general
learning algorithms with partial information. A partial
monitoring framework was introduced in (Piccolboni and
Schindelhauer, 2001) and was extensively studied (e.g., in
Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006, §6.4)) for online learning
with feedback matrices. However, this setting is restricted
to learning problems where the utilities are chosen from a
finite set, e.g., {0, 1}. More recently, Mannor and Shamir
(2011) introduced a novel framework in which the learning
agent is equipped with a sequence of feedback graphs over
the action space encoding which additional information is
revealed by every action. In case the feedback graph is
known before picking the action, Lykouris et al. (2017)
obtained small loss regret guarantees that do not depend
on the number of actions. In case the feedback graph
is revealed only after picking the action, the works of
(Alon et al., 2015, 2017) derived regret bounds as a
function of the feedback graphs’ independence numbers
(or sizes of their maximum acyclic subgraphs). In contrast
to these works, in our auction framework such graphs
may not be known to the bidders at any point during
the game. For instance, in the general market problem
considered in Section 3.3 revelation probabilities for the
additional information originate from a hidden feedback
graph, and we have to develop meaningful heuristics to
compute these parameters. Finally, partial information in
the context of multi-agent learning have been explored in
(Sessa et al., 2019), assuming players can observe their
opponents’ actions, in addition to the standard bandit
feedback. Differently, in this work we do not assume
observation of opponents’ bids.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
lays out the preliminaries for the auction framework and
existing no-regret algorithms. Our algorithm is proposed in
Section 3, followed by two applications. Section 4 presents
the case studies based on optimal power flow and the Swiss
reserve market. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Repeated Auction Framework
We consider a general reverse (or procurement) auction
problem. The set of participants consists of the bidders
` ∈ N = {1, . . . , |N |}. Let there be q ∈ N types
of goods/supplies in the auction. For instance, in an
electricity market, these types could refer to active and
reactive power injections at different nodes, and also
control reserves. Goods of the same type from different
bidders are interchangeable to the auctioneer. We assume
each bidder has a private true cost function c` : X` → R+,
X` ⊆ Rq+. We further assume that 0 ∈ X` and c`(0) = 0. 1
Each bidder ` has a finite strategy set K` = {1, . . . , |K`|}
that consists of its true cost function and bid functions
of the form bk` : Xk` → R+, Xk` ⊆ Rq+, where k ∈ K`,
0 ∈ Xk` ⊆ Rq+, and bk` (0) = 0. Without loss of generality,
1 ∈ K` corresponds to the true cost function.
Let T ∈ N be the horizon length. We assume that
for all rounds the true costs and the strategy set K`
remain unchanged. Let k`(t) ∈ K` denote the strategy
of bidder ` at time t ≤ T. Given the strategy profile
B(t) = {bk`(t)` }`∈N , a mechanism defines an allocation
rule x∗` (B(t)) ∈ Xk`(t)` , and a payment rule p`(B(t)) ∈ R
for each bidder `. In many auctions, the allocation rule is
determined by an optimization problem of the form,
J(B(t)) = min
x∈X(t)
∑
`∈N
b
k`(t)
` (x`)
s.t.
∑
`∈N
x` ∈ S ,
(1)
where X(t) =
∏
`∈N X
k`(t)
` ⊂ Rq|N |+ , and the set S ⊂ Rq+
corresponds to the market constraints. In an electric-
ity market, these constraints may correspond to network
balance constraints found in optimal power flow prob-
lems (Wu et al., 1996), or probabilistic security require-
ments found in control reserves markets (Abbaspourtor-
bati and Zima, 2015). With the definition above, we also
assume that the market constraints remain unchanged
throughout the horizon.
Let the optimal solution of (1) be denoted by x∗(B(t)).
We assume that in case of multiple optima there is a tie-
breaking rule. The utility of bidder ` is linear in the pay-
ment received; u`(t) = u`(B(t)) = p`(B(t))− c`(x∗` (B(t))).
A bidder whose bid is not accepted, x∗` (B(t)) = 0, is not
paid, u`(t) = 0, and is referred to as loser.
The fundamental goal in auction theory is efficiency, which
is attained when problem (1) is solved under the con-
dition that the bidders submitted their true costs (Kr-
ishna, 2009). Since the bidders strategize to receive larger
payments, there has been many proposals for different
payment rules, for instance, the pay-as-bid (Bernheim and
Whinston, 1986; Karaca and Kamgarpour, 2017), loca-
tional marginal pricing (Schweppe et al., 1988), Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) (Krishna, 2009; Sessa et al., 2017),
and core-selecting mechanisms (Day and Milgrom, 2008).
Even though these payment rules are well-discussed in
terms of how the bidders should pick their strategies in a
Nash equilibrium, in reality bidders are profit maximizing
entities that compete under privacy considerations and
limited information. Hence, it may not be realistic to
assume that they can compute or they would be will-
1 This holds for many electricity markets that do not allow shot-
down costs, see (Karaca and Kamgarpour, 2018) for a discussion.
ing to pick their Nash equilibrium strategy. 2 Instead,
a more practical assumption is that the bidders choose
their strategies following simple adaptive and sequential
algorithms based on observed auction data.
2.2 No-Regret Learning and Correlated Equilibrium
The performance of a generic bidder ` in a repeated
auction can be measured in terms of regret, which is a
standard notion used in the online learning literature to
measure the performance of a sequential decision making
algorithm (see, e.g., (Shalev-Shwartz, 2012; Cesa-Bianchi
and Lugosi, 2006)). For the following, define B−`(t) =
{bkj(t)j }j∈N\{`}.
Definition 1. (Regret). The regret of bidder ` at time T is
R`(T ) = max
k∈K`
T∑
t=1
u`({B−`(t), bk` })−
T∑
t=1
u`(t) .
After T rounds, hence, R`(T ) quantifies the maximum
profit bidder ` could have made had she known the
sequence of opponents’ bids ahead of time, and had she
chosen the best fixed strategy in K`. An algorithm for
bidder ` is no-regret if R`(T )/T → 0 as T →∞.
In a multi-agent setting like the aforementioned auction
problems, the notion of regret has a close connection to
equilibria. In fact, it can be shown that if every participant
bids according to a no-regret algorithm, the empirical
distribution of bids converge to a coarse-correlated equi-
librium (CCE) of the one-shot game (Cesa-Bianchi and
Lugosi, 2006).
Definition 2. (CCE). A coarse-correlated equilibrium is a
distribution σ over
∏
`∈N K` such that, for each bidder
l ∈ N ,
EB∼σ [u`(B)] ≥ EB∼σ
[
u`({B−`, bk` })
]
, ∀k ∈ K` .
As a remark, CCEs are the largest (and the weakest) class
of equilibria, and include pure and mixed Nash Equilibria
(NE). However, computing any NE is PPAD-complete (a
weaker version of NP-completeness, see (Daskalakis et al.,
2009)) and requires full knowledge of the game.
No-regret algorithms for a generic bidder ` can be derived
by mapping the repeated auction to an online learning
problem faced by bidder `: At every round t bidder ` picks
an action k(t) ∈ K`, an adversarial environment selects a
loss vector lt ∈ [0, 1]|K`|, and bidder ` incurs loss lt[k(t)].
Since the bidders are in general aware of the range of their
utilities, we assume they can map their utilities to losses in
the [0, 1] interval. Thus, we let utility u`(t) = u`(B(t)) ∈ R
correspond to loss l`(t) = l`(B(t)) = 1 − s`(u`(B(t))) ∈
[0, 1], where s` : R → [0, 1] is a suitable monotone map.
At every round t, hence, the corresponding loss vector is:
lt =
[
l`({B−`(t), b1`}), . . . , l`({B−`(t), b|K`|` })
]
. (2)
Note that the monotonicity of sl implies that our regret
definition maps to a regret based on such loss formulation.
In order to attain no-regret, bidder ` must randomize
her actions and bid according to mixed strategies, that
2 Under the VCG mechanism, reporting true cost is the dominant
strategy of every bidder. However, bidders can still turn to group
deviations to maximize their profits (Ausubel and Milgrom, 2006).
Algorithm 1 MWU algorithm for bidder l
Input: Strategy set K` with |K`| = K, parameter η
Initialize mixed strategy w1 = [
1/K , . . . ,
1 /K ]
for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
Compute estimate l˜t of the loss vector lt ∈ [0, 1]K
Update mixed strategy:
wt+1[i] ∝ wt[i] · exp
(− η l˜t[i]), i = 1, . . . ,K
end for
is, probability distributions over K` (Cesa-Bianchi and
Lugosi, 2006). Thus, one often reasons about regrets in
expectation. Let K = |K`| be the number of actions in
the strategy set of bidder ` (we drop the dependence on
` for ease of notation) and wt ∈ [0, 1]K be the mixed
strategy of bidder ` at round t. A large family of no-
regret algorithms are based on a simple, yet effective,
Multiplicative Weight Update (MWU) rule to update
bidder l’s mixed strategy (Freund and Schapire, 1997).
Such update rule is summarized in Algorithm 1. At every
time t, wt+1 is computed proportionally to wt via an
estimate l˜t of the loss vector lt. The performance of such
algorithms depend on the chosen estimate.
Full-information feedback algorithms such as Hedge (Fre-
und and Schapire, 1997) use the true loss vector lt
(which in our case corresponds to (2)) as the esti-
mate l˜t. Such algorithms attain an optimal expected
regret of O(√T logK). However, full-information feed-
back is unrealistic in repeated auctions, since computing
l`({B−`(t), bk` }) for k 6= k`(t) requires the full knowledge
of the bids B−`(t) and the market constraints to generate
solutions of the optimization problem (1).
Bandit algorithms such as Exp3 (Auer et al., 2002) use
only the obtained loss l`(t) to build an estimate of the loss
vector as:
l˜t =
[
0, . . . , 0,
l`(t)
wt[k`(t)]
, 0, . . . , 0
]
. (3)
Although one can show that l˜t is an unbiased estimate
of the true loss vector lt, that is, Ek∼wt
[˜
lt[i]
]
= lt[i] for
all i ∈ K`, the variance of l˜t[i] grows with the inverse
of the squared probability wt[i]
2. This leads to an ex-
pected regret of O(√KT logK) (matching an algorithm-
independent lower bound (Auer et al., 2002) up to log
factors), which scales significantly worse with the number
of actions K and often leads to poor performance.
3. NO-REGRET LEARNING FROM PARTIALLY
OBSERVED DATA
While the full-information feedback is unrealistic, the
feedback information available in repeated auctions is
typically richer than the bandit feedback. In fact, when
bidder ` is a loser of the auction, not only she observes
the loss for the chosen bid, which corresponds to l`(0), but
often can also infer about other actions that would have led
to such losing outcome. This is the key idea that we exploit
to improve upon the regret bound of the existing bandit
Exp3 algorithm. We will then make it more concrete in
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 by considering two specific classes of
auctions. As a remark, when bidder ` is a winner of the
auction she can often infer about other winning actions;
however, she cannot infer the exact utilities. We plan on
addressing this fact in our future work.
3.1 Extended Exp3 Algorithm
Consider time t, and assume bidder ` loses the auction,
that is, x∗(B(t)) = 0. In this case, we assume bidder ` gets
to know of a subset Lt ⊆ K` of losing actions (including
k`(t))), i.e., actions which would have led to the same
losing outcome. In the class of auctions considered in
Sections 3.2, for instance, bidder ` finds out about Lt from
the marginal price set by the auctioneer.
For any action k ∈ K`, we let rt[k] denote the probability
that bidder ` discovers the utility of action k. We refer
to rt[k]’s as the revelation probabilities. Note that rt[k]
is always greater than the probability wt[k] of playing
action k, since when action k is played, bidder ` directly
discovers its utility. However, as explained before, bidder `
can find out about losing actions even when playing actions
i 6= k. We will provide an explicit expression of such
probabilities for the auctions considered in Sections 3.2
and 3.3. For now, suppose such revelation probabilities
are known to bidder `. Using this information, bidder `
can construct the following estimator, for any k ∈ K`:
l˜t[k] =

l`(t)
rt[k]
, if x∗` (B(t)) > 0 and k = k`(t),
0, if x∗` (B(t)) > 0 and k 6= k`(t),
l`(0)
rt[k]
, if x∗` (B(t)) = 0 and k ∈ Lt,
0, if x∗` (B(t)) = 0 and k /∈ Lt ,
(4)
where l`(0) = 1− s`(0) for the sake of brevity, and rt[k] =
wt[k] for the first case in which the bidder is winning. In
words, if action k`(t) is a winning action, the estimator (4)
coincides with the bandit feedback estimator (3). On the
other hand, if k`(t) is a losing action, l˜t computed above
has a larger number of non-zero entries compared to (3).
It is not hard to prove the following fact, which is the key
to obtaining a sublinear regret bound.
Fact 1. The estimator l˜t computed as in (4) is an unbiased
estimate of the true loss vector lt in (2).
Proof. We prove that, at any given time t, Ek∼wt
[˜
lt[i]
]
=
lt[i] for every action i ∈ K`. First, consider any i such that
x∗({B−`(t), bi`}) > 0 (winning action). We have:
Ek∼wt
[˜
lt[i]
]
= wt[i] · l`(t)
wt[i]
+ (1−wt[i]) · 0 = lt[i] ,
since loss lt[i] is revealed only when action i is sampled,
hence when l`(t) = lt[i]. Then, consider actions i such that
x∗({B−`(t), bi`}) = 0 (losing actions). We have:
Ek∼wt
[˜
lt[i]
]
= rt[i] · l`(0)
rt[i]
+ (1− rt[i]) · 0 = lt[i] ,
since rt[i] is by definition the probability that i is revealed
to be a losing action. Moreover, lt[i] = l`(0) follows from i
being a losing action. 
Compared to the standard bandit estimator in (3), the
estimator considered above has a strictly smaller variance
(since rt[k] ≥ wt[k] for all k) by virtue of the additional
information used. To quantify such improvement, we de-
fine the quantity αkt :=
rt[k]
wt[k]
. It measures the additional
knowledge available to bidder ` about the loss lt[k], when
compared to the standard bandit feedback. Note that
αkt ≥ 1, and it increases with the information available
to bidder l. Moreover, to make our results explicit, we
define the following aggregate quantity, called the average
feedback information.
Definition 3. (Average feedback information). The aver-
age feedback information available to bidder ` over T
auction rounds is
αavg :=
(
1
TK
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
1
αkt
)−1
∈ [1, K] .
Bandit feedback corresponds to αavg = 1, since rt[k] =
wt[k] for all k, while αavg = K in case of full-information
feedback, since rt[k] = 1 for all k. In repeated auctions,
(based on the previous discussions) the average feedback
information αavg depends on the auction type and also
the information available to the participants, and can be
computed only after all the auction rounds are completed.
The following theorem bounds the performance of the
proposed algorithm, as a function of αavg.
Theorem 1. Assume bidder ` bids according to Algo-
rithm 1 with loss vector estimate l˜t computed as in (4)
and η =
√
2αavg log(K)/(KT ), then
E
[
R`(T )
] ≤√2 (K/αavg)T logK .
Theorem 1 generalizes the regret bounds of full-
information and bandit algorithms, obtained by setting
αavg = K or αavg = 1 respectively, to the case where
intermediate information is available to bidder `. In a
repeated auction, where αavg is typically greater than
1, the obtained regret bound strictly improves upon
standard bandit guarantees. Our proof is relegated to
Appendix A and it follows from standard online learning
arguments by making use of Fact 1 and Definition 3. To
optimally select the learning rate η, the value αavg needs
to be known ahead of time. However, we expect that
the bidders could estimate this value from the previous
auction rounds. In practice, in our experiments we show
that a wide-range of η leads to desirable performance.
In comparison with the works considering feedback graphs
(Alon et al., 2015, 2017; Lykouris et al., 2017), Theorem 1
does not depend on any graph-theoretic quantity; instead,
it depends on the notion of average feedback information
defined above. This makes it applicable to our more
general auction framework in that the way the additional
information originates can be unknown to the bidders
(see Section 3.3). Comparing with their algorithms and
regret bounds, Alon et al. (2017) use an estimator that
coincides with (4) where the revelation probabilities are
computed from the feedback graph, and obtain the regret
bound
√
2
∑T
t=1mt logK, where mt is a precomputed
upper bound on the maximum size of acyclic subgraphs
of the feedback graph at round t. On the other hand,
(Lykouris et al., 2017) requires knowing the feedback
graphs ahead of time and relies on a different algorithm
which is a freezing modification to Hedge. Their regret
bound holds with high probability and it is of the form
o(βL∗), where L∗ is the loss of the best fixed strategy,
and β is an upper bound on the independence number
of the feedback graphs at all rounds. Finally, note that
these works replace the
√
K term of the regret bounds of
bandit algorithms with a graph-theoretic quantity, which
might still be equal to
√
K in the worst-case.
3.2 Auctions with Simple Constraints and Convex Bids
We consider a simpler auction problem where the auction-
eer has to procure a fixed amount Q ∈ R+ of a single type
of good. In addition to the assumptions in Section 2, each
bidder is now equipped with a finite strategy set consisting
of strongly convex and increasing cost/bid functions 3 over
compact intervals. The allocation rule is given by,
x∗(B(t)) = arg min
x∈X(t)
∑
`∈N
b
k`(t)
` (x`) (5a)
s.t.
∑
`∈N
x` ≥ Q . (5b)
As a remark, some of the European reserve and day-
ahead markets belong to this class since they ignore
the network constraints. Let λ∗(B(t)) ∈ R+ denote the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint in (5b),
called the marginal price, and it is announced after each
round t to all bidders. The payment rule is then given by
p`(B(t)) = λ∗(B(t))x∗` (B(t)).
Next, assume in round t bidder ` is a loser with x∗` (B(t)) =
0. From the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions
and strong duality of (5) (Bertsekas, 1999), for any k ∈ K`,
we have
d
dx
bk` (x)
∣∣∣
x=0
≥ λ∗(B(t)) ⇐⇒ x∗` ({B−l(t), bk` }) = 0 .
Equivalently, the marginal price information enables a
losing bidder to be aware of all the other losing actions
in its strategy set. 4 Hence, bidder ` gets to known the set
of all losing actions:
Lt = {k ∈ K` | d
dx
bk` (x)
∣∣∣
x=0
≥ λ∗(B(t))} .
Notice that the set above is meaningful only when bidder `
is a loser, since otherwise marginal price can potentially
change whenever bidder ` picks another action.
In the partially observed information setting described
above, a generic losing action k is revealed when any other
losing action is played, since each losing action reveals
the full set of losing actions Lt. Hence, the revelation
probabilities are given by:
rt[k] =

∑
j∈Lt
wt[j], if x
∗
` (B(t)) = 0 and k ∈ Lt,
wt[k], otherwise.
Observe that, in the first case, the probabilities are
calculated by a sum, since choosing different losing actions
constitute independent events. Then, the estimator l˜t
in (4) can be obtained by plugging the probabilities
defined above.
3 Here, strong convexity is assumed to eliminate ties. Our results
can easily be generalized to the convex setting.
4 Similar arguments can be made for any Lagrange multiplier-based
payments under strong duality and strong convexity.
3.3 General Auctions
We now consider the general auction problem introduced
in (1), Assume in round t bidder ` is a loser with
x∗` (B(t)) = 0. Since the allocation rule is given by an
optimization problem, it can be verified that
x∗` (B(t)) = 0 =⇒ x∗` ({B−`(t), bk` }) = 0, ∀k ∈ Lt,
where
Lt = {k ∈ K` |Xk` ⊆ Xk`(t)` ,
and ∀x ∈ Xk` , bk` (x) ≥ bk`(t)` (x)}.
(6)
In words, if b
k`(t)
` : X
k`(t)
` → R+ is a losing bid function,
also the bid functions that lie in the epigraph of b
k`(t)
`
are losing. Note that Xk` ⊆ Xk`(t)` is required since the
bid function can be assumed to take infinitely large
values outside of its domain. The statement above holds
regardless of the payment rule, and thus it is applicable
to a wide-range of auctions.
In such a general framework, a generic action i is revealed
either when action i is picked, or when a losing action j is
picked such that action i belongs the epigraph of action j.
Hence, to define the revelation probabilities, we define the
set of all losing actions by
Lt = {k ∈ K` |x∗` ({B−`(t), bk` }) = 0},
and we let
Rk = {j ∈ K` |Xj` ⊇ Xk` , and∀x ∈ Xk` , bj`(x) ≤ bk` (x)},
be the set of all actions for which the action k ∈ K`
belongs to the epigraph of the corresponding bid function.
Then, according to our previous arguments, the revelation
probabilities correspond to
rt[k]=

∑
j∈Lt∩Rk
wt[j], if x
∗
` (B(t))=0 and k∈Lt,
wt[k], otherwise.
(7)
Observe that, in the first case, the sum involves all losing
actions that can reveal information about action k.
Computing these probabilities requires knowing the set of
all losing actions Lt, which is in general unknown to the
bidders. To apply our proposed algorithm in such a general
framework, we propose the following heuristic choice:
rˆt[k] =
wt[k] +
∑
j∈Rk\{Wt∪k}
wt[j],
if x∗` (B(t))=0,
and k∈Lt,
wt[k], otherwise,
whereWt ⊂ K` is the set of actions that lead to a non-zero
allocation at every instance up to time t. Such set can
be computed by bidder ` based on the previous auction
rounds. Note that the above heuristic approximates the
true rt[k] by assuming that the actions that always lead
to non-zero allocations (Wt) are the ones that would lead
to non-zero allocations in the current auction round. If
Wt is equivalent to the latter set, the heuristic coincides
with (7). When such revelation probabilities are plugged
in (4), the resulting estimator l˜t may not be unbiased and
hence the result of Theorem 1 is not directly applicable.
Nevertheless, in our numerical case studies we will
showcase the performance of the proposed heuristic in
realistic electricity market models.
Table 1. True cost function data.
Bidder a` d` X`
1 0.1 8 10
2 0.095 9 10
3 0.105 10 10
Table 2. Number of zero-allocations (averaged
over 50 runs) for Bidder 2.
Exp3 Extended Exp3 Hedge
183/600 131/600 98/600
4. NUMERICAL STUDIES
Our goal is to compare the performance of the discussed
algorithms based on realistic electricity market examples.
First, we consider an instance of the setting in Section 3.2,
and show that the proposed algorithm performs
significantly better than the standard bandit Exp3.
Second, we study the IEEE 14-bus market problem
from (Christie, 2017) to illustrate our approach discussed
for the general setting. Finally, these observations
are further verified by a study based on 2014 data
of the two-stage Swiss reserve procurement auction
from (Abbaspourtorbati and Zima, 2015).
4.1 Auction with Simple Constraints
Consider the set-up of Section 3.2, with Q = 15 MW and
three bidders with quadratic polynomial cost functions
c`(x`) = a` x
2
` + d` x`, and production limits of X` MW.
Values for such constants can be found in Table 1. Each
bidder chooses among 15 actions, obtained by perturbing
the linear terms of their cost functions as d` + δ, where
δ is chosen from a uniform distribution in the interval
[−6, 30]. Let T = 600 be the horizon. For Exp3 and
Hedge algorithms, we picked the optimal learning rates
η =
√
2 log(K)/(KT ) and η =
√
8 log(K)/T , respectively,
see (Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi, 2012). For our algorithm,
we picked η =
√
2αˆ log(K)/(KT ), by picking αˆ from
{8.5, 11, 13.5}, since the true value of αavg is not known
a-priori and it is required to lie in the interval [1,K] =
[1, 15]. These values are chosen to be the same for all
bidders. Recall that the full-information Hedge algorithm
is unrealistic in such repeated auctions and hence we run
it to upper bound the achievable performance.
Figure 1 illustrates the average regret as in Definition 1
over 50 runs and 3 bidders for the cases under which all
bidders implement Hedge, Exp3, and the extended Exp3
algorithms. Observe that the extended Exp3 algorithm
achieves a performance significantly better than Exp3,
and also close to Hedge for a wide-range of learning
rates η. Figure 2 shows the average feedback information
αavg in simulations based on different number of actions,
again averaged over 50 runs. We see that αavg is close
to K in all cases, which explains the improvement in the
bound obtained in Theorem 1. As shown in Table 2, such
additional information helps Bidder 2, who has the lowest
production cost, to discard losing actions quickly and learn
how to obtain nonzero allocations faster.
4.2 IEEE 14-Bus Optimal Power Flow Example
The following simulations are based on the IEEE 14-bus
system with DC power flow constraints, which falls in the
time
Fig. 1. Average regret (in $ and averaged over 50 runs
and 3 bidders) of different algorithms: Shaded areas
represent ± one standard deviation.
K
Fig. 2. Computed αavg as a function of the number of
actions K.
general framework of Section 3.3. The true cost functions
and the network model can be found in (Christie, 2017).
Strategy sets consists of 8 actions which are created by
perturbing the quadratic coefficient with δ1 chosen from a
uniform distribution in the interval [−0.025, 0.2], and the
linear coefficient with δ2 chosen from a uniform distribu-
tion in the interval [−10, 22]. The VCG mechanism was
proposed for such markets by Xu and Low (2015); Karaca
et al. (2019). These payments are defined as follows,
p`(B(t)) = bk`(t)` (x∗` (B(t))) + (J(B(t))− J(B−`(t))),
where J(B−`(t)) denotes the market cost when bidder `
is excluded from the auction, that is, optimal value of (5)
under the constraint x` = 0.
Let T = 600 be the horizon. For Exp3 and Hedge
algorithms, we picked the optimal learning rates
as in Section 4.1. For our algorithm, we picked
η =
√
2αˆ log(K)/(KT ) with αˆ = 3. Figure 3 shows
the average regrets over 50 runs for the cases under which
all bidders implement Hedge, Exp3, and the extended
Exp3 algorithm. Our algorithm is implemented both
using the true revelation probabilities (by announcing
Rk to the bidders) and using the heuristic proposed in
Section 3.3. The extended Exp3 algorithm attains a better
performance than the Exp3 algorithm in both cases.
4.3 Swiss Reserve Market
The following simulations are based on the bids placed
in the 46th weekly Swiss reserve procurement auction of
2014 (Abbaspourtorbati and Zima, 2015). This auction
involves 21 plants bidding for secondary reserves, 25 for
positive tertiary reserves and 21 for negative tertiary re-
serves. Since the problem size is big, we picked six of the
largest secondary reserve providers as the learning agents.
time
Fig. 3. Average regret (in $) for IEEE 14-bus.
time
Fig. 4. Average regret (in CHF) for Swiss market.
Table 3. Average social cost (in CHF).
Truthful Bidding Exp3 Extended Exp3 Hedge
2,615,800 2,652,300 2,637,400 2,635,500
In this auction, bids are discrete, that is, they are given by
sets of reserve size and price pairs. Strategy sets are created
by inflating the bid prices with multipliers from the set
{1, 1.05, 1, 15, 1.25, 1.35, 1.45}. The market involves com-
plex constraints arising from nonlinear cumulative distri-
bution functions. These constraints imply that the deficit
of reserves cannot occur with a probability higher than
0.2%. The payment rule is p`(B(t)) = bk`(t)` (x∗` (B(t))).
Let T = 600 be the horizon. For Exp3 and Hedge
algorithms, we again picked the optimal learning rates η.
For our algorithm, we picked η =
√
2αˆ log(K)/(KT )
with αˆ = 6. Figure 4 shows the average regrets over 50
runs and over 6 bidders for the cases under which all
bidders implement Hedge, Exp3, and the extended Exp3
algorithm. The extended Exp3 algorithm attains a better
performance than the Exp3 algorithm with both the true
revelation probabilities (computed by announcingRk) and
the heuristic choice from Section 3.3. In Table 3 we show
the resulting average social cost, that is, the participants’
total production cost, averaged over 600 auction rounds
and 50 runs. While there is no clear connection between
participants’ regret and social cost, pay-as-bid mechanism
does not incentivize truthful bidding and hence no-regret
algorithms increase the average social cost compared to
the truthful bidding outcome. We will explore mechanism
design with the goal of achieving lower social cost at
coarse-correlated equilibria as a future work.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered online learning in the
general class of repeated auctions. For such problems, we
have showed that the information structure lies in between
the well-studied full-information and bandit settings. Ex-
ploiting the additional information acquired by the bid-
ders whose bids are not accepted, we have formulated an
extension to the standard bandit algorithms involving a
more accurate utility estimation. We have showed that
the regret guarantee of this algorithm improves upon the
bandit algorithms. Our results were verified in several case
studies based on realistic electricity market models.
Our future work involves exploiting the released infor-
mation in case the bids are accepted. As an extension,
we are exploring the design of mechanisms with desirable
properties in their coarse-correlated equilibrium.
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Appendix A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We first bring in the following well-known second-order
bound of Algorithm 1 (MWU).
Lemma 1. For any η > 0 and for any sequence of loss
estimates {˜lt}Tt=1, we have that
T∑
t=1
∑
k∈K`
wt[k]˜lt[k]− min
k∈K`
T∑
t=1
l˜t[k]
≤ log(K)
η
+
η
2
T∑
t=1
∑
k∈K`
wt[k](˜lt[k])
2.
The proof follows from standard analysis of exponentiated
gradient algorithms (see (Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006;
Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi, 2012)). We are ready to prove
our result.
Proof. [Proof of Theorem 1] First, note that the expected
regret of bidder ` can be restated as:
E[R`(T )] = E
[
T∑
t=1
lt[k`(t)]− min
k∈K`
T∑
t=1
lt[k]
]
=
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
wt[k]lt[k]− min
k∈K`
T∑
t=1
lt[k] .
Moreover, since l˜t is an unbiased estimate of the loss vector
lt (following from Fact 1), we have
E[R`(T )] =
T∑
t=1
∑
k∈K`
wt[k]E[˜lt[k]]− min
k∈K`
T∑
t=1
E[˜lt[k]]
≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
∑
k∈K`
wt[k]˜lt[k]− min
k∈K`
T∑
t=1
l˜t[k]
]
, (A.1)
where (A.1) follows from the linearity of expectation and
Jensen’s inequality. Invoking Lemma 1, we obtain the
following upper bound
E[R`(T )] ≤ log(K)
η
+
η
2
T∑
t=1
∑
k∈K`
wt[k]E[(˜lt[k])2].
Observe that, by (4) and definition of rt, for any k ∈ K`
E[(˜lt[k])2] = rt[k] · l`(t)
2
rt[k]2
+ (1− rt[k]) · 0 = l`(t)
2
rt[k]
.
This gives us
E[R`(T )] ≤ log(K)
η
+
η
2
T∑
t=1
∑
k∈K`
wt[k]
l`(t)
2
rt[k]
=
log(K)
η
+
η
2
T∑
t=1
∑
k∈K`
1
αkt
(A.2)
=
log(K)
η
+
η
2
TK
1
αavg
, (A.3)
where in (A.2) we utilized the definition of αkt ’s and the
fact that the losses are bounded in the interval [0, 1], and
in (A.3) we utilized the definition of αavg. The result of the
theorem follows by substituting η =
√
2αavg log(K)/(KT )
in (A.3). 
